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The necessity of atheism: making sense of secularisation 1 
Callum G Brown 
 
Atheists tend not to feature in any large numbers in the historiography of secularisation. 
Aside from a few key philosophers, controversialists and scientists, the systematic study of 
atheists as a major demographic entity is not to be found within the narrative of the declining 
social significance of religion. This is a strange circumstance. By contrast, highly religious 
people feature a great deal in secularisation history, to exemplify both the religiously 
‘enchanted world’ of medieval Europe that has been lost, and the modern religious resistance 
to secularity. But, notwithstanding either Shelley's tract of 1811, from which the main title of 
this article was unintentionally torn, or recent interest in ‘new atheism’, those who have lived 
their lives as if there is no god make a negligible appearance in the social history of religion 
and its decline in the west. Disregard of, disrespect for and denial of atheism dominate by 
turns. There is a need to assert the necessity of atheism to the historical narrative, not merely 
of secularisation but of religiosity too.    
 Why should atheism hold a very poor place in the scholarship on secularisation? On 
one level, the definition of atheism forestalls much consideration; if narrowly defined as self-
identifiers with that particular term, it has often been less than 2 or 3 per cent of people in the 
west. But if the definition is widened to those who live their lives as if there is no god (which 
is likely to include some or all of those not identifying with a religion, not undertaking 
religious practice and not, as far as can be ascertained, believing in a god), then the 
proportions rise significantly - to as much as 30 to 50 per cent in some countries. Moreover, 
the historical trend is clear - these figures have been growing for half a century in most 
western nations, and are now growing in all of them.2 In truth, no single metric exists for 
atheism; nor, as argued here, can it exist. Issues of defining who has and who has not got a 
faith are fraught with difficulties, but it is appropriate and important to include amongst 
nonbelievers those indifferent to religion as well as those having no association with it. It is 
                                                          
1 I received really invaluable comments on an earlier version of this article from Lynn Abrams, Stuart Airlie, 
John Arnold, Stephen Marritt, David Nash, Andrew Roach and Don Spaeth, and notably from three anonymous 
referees. What remains after corrections and additions is my responsibility. 
2 See the attempt to quantify atheists in detail across the world in A. Keysar and J. Navaro-Rivero, 'A world of 
atheism: global demographics', in Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), 553-86.  Some of the historical data is discussed in C. G. Brown, ‘The 
People of No Religion: the demographics of secularisation in the English-speaking world since c.1900’, Archiv 
für Sozialgeschichte vol. 51 (2011), 37-61. 
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surely no longer acceptable for the scholar to nod through the membership assertions of those 
churches which lay claim to these people by virtue of infant baptism. 
There are other issues. Secularisation is becoming less accepted by religious scholars 
as a term denoting religious decline, with such decline being increasingly denied (for which 
see the Garnett et al collection).3 But beyond this is a view that secularisation arose after a 
medieval and early modern world in which atheism was inconceivable. This is understood as 
'the enchantment' (derived from Max Weber's reference to modernity becoming 
'disenchanted'4), a period identified in western history when to not have a faith of some kind 
or other, characterised by literalness of belief and absence of scepticism, was impossible or 
effectively so, and all life and politics existed inside a framework of faith. Heresies of various 
sorts might exist within faith, but, broadly, disbelief could not exist outside of it. So, at the 
opposite ends of western religious history rest two foundational and, I propose, connectable 
propositions concerning unbelief: firstly, that between roughly 1000 and 1500, atheism was 
impossible; and secondly, in the contemporary era (from around 1950 to the present), 
secularisation is not founded on the growth of atheism but instead is either a transformation 
(and, Garnett et al propose, even 'revival') of religion into new forms, or, as Jeffrey Cox has 
argued, it is a ‘rhetorical weapon’ deployed by ‘secular thinkers’ in the ‘grand struggle 
between science and religion’.5 By these devices, denying atheism enables the denial of 
secularisation. Defending secularisation as a valid concept of the historical decline of religion 
in the west is for another article. The purpose here is to defend the place of atheism in the 
historical record.  
As its sounding board, this article takes Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007). 
Atheism has a rather underwhelming presence in his narrative, appearing on only 27 of the 
776 pages of his text.6 Moreover, the character Taylor ascribes to it – at one moment 
idolatrous and communistic in a Cold War mode, at another ‘hardline materialistic’, and at 
every turn ‘self-valorising’ and exuding a ‘dismissive attitude’ to religion – makes clear its 
relegation in his recounting of either secularisation or the ‘exclusive humanism’ to which he 
                                                          
3 See for instance J. Garnett et al (eds.), Redefining Christian Britain: Post 1945 Perspectives (London, SCM, 
2006).  Tackling denial is S. Bruce, Secularisation: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
4 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (London, Methuen, 1965), 125. 
5 Jeffrey Cox, ‘Towards eliminating the concept of secularisation: a progress report, in C. Brown and M. Snape 
(eds.), Secularisation in the Christian World: Essays in honour of Hugh McLeod (Farnham, Ashgate, 20010), 13-
26 at 15. 
6 That is the count from the book’s index entry, all of them fleeting and usually pejorative dismissals.  
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attributes his version of modernity.7 In truth, Taylor dismisses atheism as a misplaced 
philosophical idea, leaving his imagined secular age as quite a Christian one. His narrative 
owes more to Christian heroes of thought, and the search for eternity, transcendence and 
spirituality, than to rationality and living life as if there is no god. On the face of it, Taylor is 
not a secularisation denier as are some other Christian scholars, but he relegates atheism to a 
walk-on role.8   
Taylor is honest in speaking of observing the issue from the point of view of a 
'believer', a Canadian Catholic. Most western religious history of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries is written by the religious, though this is much less true of the medieval and 
early modern periods. The contrasting paradox is that the history of the secular is of limited 
interest to the non-religious scholar, rarely featuring more than cursorily in general history 
text books of the late modern period. This results in the terms of research and debate tending 
to be defined by the religious. The scholar of secularisation is in debt constantly to concepts 
and measures of ‘the religious’, the religious interpretation of ‘the spiritual’, and the 
dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. There is, roughly speaking, no independent 
secular manner of speaking about the secular condition or secularisation, no well-developed 
unbelievers’ language of unbelief in scholarship. This is a huge problem. As one scholar has 
written: ‘Studying non-religion using tools developed to study religion effectively makes 
non-religiousness or atheism a religious position. This is surely not an acceptable state of 
affairs in academe.’9   
To think of remedial action, this article focuses on three central problems in Taylor’s 
book which reflect the whole field of study. First is his understanding of the starting state of 
religion, what Taylor describes at length as 'the enchanted world' of medieval and early 
modern Europe; second is his understanding of the process of secularisation, how the western 
world changed from being enchanted to being less enchanted, from unavoidably believing in 
god to unavoidably having doubts about god; and third, delineating the contemporary secular 
condition of the western world in terms of dependence on Christianity. In relation to the last 
of these, Taylor presents three stages of western secularity. The first stage was that carved out 
roughly in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century world – what he refers to as Secularity 1, 
the secularisation of public space. The second is that which took a hold from the middle of 
the eighteenth century and progressed into the nineteenth century, tagged as Secularity 2, the 
                                                          
7 C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge Mass., Belknap Press, 2007), 591, 676, 721, 769.  
8 Taylor, 429.  
9 This was a remark of an anonymous referee of this article. 
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decline of belief and religious practice. The third is that formed in the second half of the 
twentieth century, which he calls Secularity 3, a new condition of belief which ‘puts an end to 
the naïve acknowledgement of the transcendent, or of goals or claims which go beyond 
human flourishing.’10 The net narrative he promulgates is an attempt to describe 
secularisation as not a ‘subtraction story’ and not as a linear story, but ‘a zig-zag account’ of 
the conditions of the self, rather than just about a loss of (religious) things.11 Worthy as these 
aims may seem, the story Taylor tells starts from the wrong place, moves forward 
questionably, and finishes in a misunderstood present. An alternative way of imagining 
atheism across periods is required. Notwithstanding capitalism, secularisation is the greatest 
cultural shift of the western world. How we detect and conceptualise it should be central to 
the History discipline. 
 
  
 
(a) Disenchantment with the enchanted world 
In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor sets up a polarity between, on the one hand, the medieval 
‘enchanted world’ and, on the other, a modern condition in which religious belief is not only 
no longer normative, but also seemingly difficult for very large numbers of people to 
contemplate.  This polarity is a quite traditional narrative of ‘otherness’ – between the naïve 
religiosity of the medieval and early modern periods, and the ‘knowing’ and naïveté-
impossible belief condition of the present. Taylor founds the mediaeval belief condition on a 
notion of exclusive god-belief – the unavoidability of it, and the conformity of all people to 
this enchanted world (of which more in a moment). Characterising the period all the way 
down to 1500, though, is Taylor’s concept of ‘the porous self’ in which he claims there was a 
universal concept of possessability by demons and spirits. This, for Taylor, is not a matter of 
belief or a theory, but is ‘a fact of experience’ (italics original), unavoidable in a pre-modern 
world where 'enchanted' culture dominated to the exclusion of all else. He refers to the notion 
that ‘things and agencies which are clearly extra-human could alter or shape our spiritual or 
emotional condition’, and that ‘they helped to constitute us emotionally and spiritually’.12 It 
seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that Taylor envisages the medieval human, certainly 
                                                          
10 Taylor, 21. 
11 Taylor, 95. 
12 Taylor, 39- 40.  
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of the peasantry, as entirely programmable by outside things. In this unavoidable terror of 
possession, ‘disbelief is hard in the enchanted world’.13  
Taylor is not of course original in all of this. The ‘Age of Faith’, once the basis of 
European religious historiography, survives in this volume when it has been under scrutiny 
for decades. Lucian Febvre's influential claim to the intellectual impossibility of atheism in 
early modern France14 was carefully moderated in 1990 by John Edwards who, in examining 
evidence from Spain, argued that 'there was indeed genuine religious scepticism' in the late 
fifteenth century. He concluded: 'The Sorian evidence clearly shows that virtually every 
theological and philosophical option which has so far become available to humankind was 
espoused by someone in this region of Spain in the late fifteenth century.'15 The ‘enchanted 
world’ was described by Peter Laslett in his 1966 book The World We Have Lost, where he 
counted the communicants in one English parish, that of Goodnestone in Kent, in 1676, 
showing that all bar sixteen had showed up, and used this to sum up the religious condition of 
early modern England thus: ‘All our ancestors were literal Christian believers, all of the 
time.’ With every village meeting taking place in the church, religion was a definer of local 
society, so that Laslett asserted that ‘their world was a Christian world and their religious 
activity was spontaneous, not forced on them from above.’16  But this religiously 
homogenous view was tempered by Michael Hunter who, in his study of atheism in early 
modern England in 1985, found that, even though he might define atheism narrowly as being 
‘what a twentieth-century reader might expect “atheism” to imply, namely overt hostility to 
religion’, seventeenth-century English rhetoric marshalled ‘atheism’ in various ways, ranging 
from the heretical, dangerous and polluting, to the mere 'godlessness' of the impious. He 
showed that atheist was a term, as a contemporary put it, 'of a very large extent', and not just a 
term of abuse, but of well-imagined freethinkers with resonance in our own age.17  
A sophisticated historiography sceptical of enchantment has been developing since 
Keith Thomas’ 1971 book on Religion and the Decline of Magic offered a broadly 
                                                          
13 Taylor, 41 
14 L. Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1982), especially 16, 335-53, 455-64. 
15 J. Edwards, 'Religious faith and doubt in late medieval Spain: Sorio c. 1450-1500', Past & Present 120 (1988): 
3-25 at  21, 24. See also J. Somerville, 'Debate: Religious faith, doubt and atheism' and J. Edwards 'Reply', in 
Past & Present 128 (1990): 152-161. 
16 P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost (London, Methuen, 1965), 71-2. 
17 M. Hunter, ‘The problem of “atheism” in early modern England’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
vol. 35 (1985): 135-157 at 135, 142. For a vicar’s 1670s’ description of non-churchgoing as ‘Aitheisme’,see D. 
Spaeth, The Church in An Age of Danger; Parsons and Parishioners, 1660-1740 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press), 180.  
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unconvinced view about the sincerity of early-modern peasant religiosity; he speaks of a 
‘continuity of popular scepticism’ stretching from medieval to seventeenth centuries.18 In the 
1970s, Alexander Murray posited the idea of a ‘rationalist culture’ developing in European 
society between 1000 and the thirteenth century, evoking a rationalistic view of the way God 
worked in nature and society, giving birth in the European intellectual and merchant elites to 
an arithmetical mentality and the ‘art of number’. Pride in intellect, not faith, mattered most, 
leading to retreat from superstition and the rising ‘group-interest of the educated’ which, even 
when agents of religion, by the fifteenth century served two estates – church and studium. If 
you read Murray on the Middle Ages, the advance of reason, of understanding of ‘natural 
laws’, not of enchantment, contrasts starkly with Taylor’s naïve depiction of naïve medieval 
culture.19   
Scholarship on medieval scepticism and unbelief has continued to grow. The tone was 
set by Susan Reynolds in 1991 who noted just how mistaken is the medieval historian who 
believes monks and priests on popular belief: ‘Taking their word as evidence of general belief 
is like taking television commercials as evidence of the public's preferences among pet-foods. 
The miracle stories are full of scoffers.’20 Reynolds demolished the reasoning behind the 
enchanted world while more recent scholarship points to the chaos of belief in medieval 
Europe. It has been observed by some that the historian of the pre-modern period has too 
often tended to view the peasant people as pre-individuals, absorbing uncritically the 
dominant ideas of the group to which they belong.21 Reynolds argued against the 
presumption of many historians that people in different societies think differently, including 
that medieval people are less rational and more naturally religious than modern people. 
‘There seems to be no hard evidence that scepticism is unknown even in the most untouched 
and traditional societies.’ Scoffers were rife in medieval sources, and early-modern preachers 
were clearly reacting to the ‘atheists’ they regularly denounced.22 What Taylor doesn’t permit 
is the possibility that fear of demons, attested to in different epochs, might be separate from 
                                                          
18 K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular beliefs in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
century England (orig. 1971, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978), 200. 
19 A. Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978), 110, 136-7, 209, 
257, 260, 312. 
20 Reynolds, ‘Social mentalities', 21 – 41 at 29.  
21 N. Partner, ‘The Hidden Self’,  in N. Partner (ed.), Writing Medieval History (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 
2005), 42. See also Christina Larner, The Thinking Peasant: Popular and Educated Beliefs in Pre-Industrial 
Culture (Glasgow, Pressgang, 1982). 
22 Susan Reynolds, ‘Social mentalities and the case of medieval scepticism’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society vol. 1 (1991): 21-41 at 21-4; K. Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009),.233. 
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god-belief. In the same vein, Steven Justice, reacting to Taylor’s passé vision of uniform 
literal belief, asked in an incredulous voice ‘Did medieval people really believe all this?’. He 
has made a sophisticated case for understanding medieval accounts of miracles and belief as 
having demystification and scepticism built into their narratives, with a manner of 
storytelling that invites a silencing of scepticism: ‘The miracle stories and saints’ lives 
suggest the possibility that a deeper skepticism, tacit and pervasive and so diffuse as to elude 
useful formulation or response, may have attached itself routinely to other and still larger 
matters, like the reality of God.’23 Religious stories, like others, contained messages and 
morals which invited to be taken anything but literally.  
Enchantment scepticism has grown in various directions. Bruce Robbins has critiqued 
whether Weber really thought that disenchantment had happened in the way normally 
understood, and part of that question concerns whether the idealised community supposed to 
have supported it was a myth promulgated by the elites.24 Questioning that myth is important, 
and it can be impeded when, as in the contemporary western world, the vast bulk of 
researching, writing and recording about religion has been undertaken by the religious 
scholar. The religious historian brings a special expertise, often theological and liturgical, to 
research, but, as John Arnold has shown, the atheist historian has a special role too in 
bringing sensitivity to ways in which the medieval inquisitor has, for instance, chosen to 
misinterpret disbelief as heresy, or, alternatively, has ignored the silent atheist when s/he is 
not a threat to power.25 The number of references to unbelief was proportionately very small 
in the medieval period, but, as Reynolds says, this is not surprising given the serious 
consequences if the church found out about expressions of scepticism or unbelief.26 
Moreover, as Reynolds says, once it is admitted that medieval atheism was possible, a 
reassessment is required of evidence of heresy, impiety, indifference and anti-clericalism as 
signs of atheism.27 Identifying who could be living a life without a god, whilst saying or 
doing little by way of self-identifying as a non-believer, requires acumen.  
In relation to medieval Europe, the greatest evidential collecting and analysis of 
unbelief and atheism has been that by John Arnold who has delved deep in medieval sources 
for the sceptic, the unbeliever and the truculent ungodly. He is straightforward in his assault 
                                                          
23 S. Justice, ‘Did the Middle Ages believe in their miracles’, Representations vol. 103 (2008): 1-29 at 3, 17-18, 
21. 
24 B. Robbins, ‘Enchantment? No, Thank You!’, in G. Levine (ed.), The Joy of Secularism: 11 Essays for How We 
Live Now (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011), 74-94 at 74, 81. 
25 J. H. Arnold, Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe (London, Bloomsbury Academic, orig. 2005, 2010), 7-8. 
26 Reynolds, 33-5; see also Arnold, Belief, 20-1. 
27 Reynolds, 36-8. 
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on the enchanted world thesis: ‘There has been a long-standing tradition that claims that 
unbelief, in the sense of cynicism, atheism, irreligion and so forth, was “impossible” in the 
pre-modern period; that prior to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, nobody was mentally 
capable of thinking outside the accepted framework of religion. This is simply not true.’28 He 
has studied belief and unbelief together, isolating indicators of ways of unbelief in the midst 
of apparent expressions of belief, and reassessing the judgements of church clergy and 
inquisitors in case they might have mistaken simple disbelief for heresy; and challenges to 
Christian hegemony of thought emerge from his study of the medieval concern for death and 
community. Arnold reflects on the limits of acculturation of medieval Christianity in Europe 
– of people, large numbers of them, having different layers of resistance, disinterest, and 
scepticism about the discursive power that reigns in a hegemonic culture. Much of the 
resistance to church doctrine of the Eucharist, he notes, was ‘rooted in cognition about the 
material experience of reality’, to the extent, he argues, that ‘materiality underlies unbelief’.29 
And the people’s link to the church was more about freedom and choice than a reading of 
Taylor would lead you to believe - a variegated spectrum that reached out to disbelief and 
beyond.30 Also, Arnold is especially good at critiquing community that appears, as in Taylor, 
as an unalloyed good thing, when community was also oppressive, coercive and full of 
ecclesiastical violence and shaming in sexual policing and, later, in the witch-hunts.31 Arnold 
is particularly persuasive on the complex way that medieval selfhood developed, and the 
tensions between group and personal pieties, and the socially-limited behavioural impact they 
had.32 He concludes with an interesting and important observation on the long-term – that 
there was a flexibility and freedom to individual religious belief and unbelief in the medieval 
period which was ground down in later medieval, reformation and Counter-Reformation 
periods; that contrary to the notion of growing toleration, early–modern Europe brought ‘a 
tightening up of definition and control, and a closing down of certain fuzziness and room for 
manoeuvre’.33 In this way, Arnold’s work challenges not just the enchanted world as the 
starting point for European Christian civilisation, but brings a welcome concern for religion 
as power, as a field of supremacy, involving church and lay leaders, who use it in Arnold's 
                                                          
28 Arnold, Belief, 4. 
29 J. Arnold, ‘The materiality of unbelief in late medieval England’, in Sophie Page (ed.), The Unorthodox 
Imagination in Late Medieval Britain (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005), 65-95 at 76. 
30 Arnold, Belief, 27-68. 
31 Arnold, Belief, 105-142. 
32 Arnold, Belief, 143-190. 
33 Arnold, Belief, 191-231. For further evidence of unbelief and ecclesiastical concern with it, see J. Arnold, 
‘Doomed or Disinterested? Did all medieval people believe in God’, BBC History Magazine (January 2009): 39-
43.  
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words as ‘essentially a mulch within which other things occur’ – a perspective extended by 
R.I. Moore in his excoriating studies of heresy hunting as medieval religion and centralising 
government producing 'the birth of a persecuting society'.34  
To this work on medieval unbelief has been added recently Tim Whitmarsh’s 
magisterial study of atheism in ancient Greece and Rome, which not only shows the vigour of 
repudiation of deities but the inherent nature of unbelief as an element in intellectual and 
political culture. Atheism is not a modern invention of the Enlightenment, science and 
modern scepticism. He challenges the notion of Karen Armstrong and many others that 
supernatural belief is fundamental to humanity, or that it is hardwired in the individual. His 
work is so convincing as to suggest the central place of unbelief as a narrative possibility in 
ancient myth, as a building block of the human condition from the very birth of European 
organised religions.35 Taken together with the evidence from the medieval period, we are 
surely in a position now to join the chronological dots and posit unbelief as a continuous and 
influential presence in both intellectual and popular culture throughout the recorded history of 
European civilisation.  
Against this background of historical reconceptualization and empirical research, it is 
no longer possible to accept Taylor’s effusive position on medieval and early-modern 
religion: ‘it was virtually impossible not to believe in, say, 1500 in our Western society’; ‘in 
those days everyone believed’; features of ‘their world’ ‘made the presence of God seemingly 
undeniable’.36 To understand unbelief, Taylor would have needed a meaningful discussion of 
protest to religion as power – of the parish turning into the surveillance society in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century Europe (and much of colonial America too), with spreading laws 
against blasphemy, church controls (Protestant and Catholic), visitations, commissions and 
inquisitions.37 Jon Butler excoriates Taylor for not being grounded in this amassed evidence, 
especially of ‘ordinary people’, and his reliance on ‘ideas’ to delineate the nature of religion 
upon the self. Belief, in Taylor’s hands, becomes disjoined from social forces, from peasant 
and everyday experience, and from the evidence of these. ‘One could not but encounter God 
everywhere’ is a splendid naivety.38  The evidence shows that god was clearly not only not 
                                                          
34 Arnold, Belief, 6; R.I. Moore, The War on Heresy: Faith and Power in Medieval Europe (London, Profile, 
2012). 
35 Tim Whitmarsh, Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2015),  4-7, 42-
3. 
36 Taylor, 25.  
37 On the increasingly uniform introduction of blasphemy statutes from the late sixteenth century, see D.S. 
Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 150-66. 
38 Taylor, 25. 
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encountered everywhere, but in very many pre-modern minds he was countered. The rhetoric 
of sceptical voices, heard faintly through the mediating minds of clerics and the faithful from 
the Plato and the ancients, and from the eleventh to seventeenth centuries, bears amazing 
similarities to the voices of today. Then as now, God was vilified by some, but in how many 
more was he simply ignored by busy people for whom, as John Arnold remarks, god belief 
was a low priority?39 Keith Thomas has recently concluded that though the Christian 
religion’s message of looking to the next world remained ascendant: ‘In practice most of the 
population implicitly took a more secular view: they cherished life for its own sake, not 
merely as a preliminary to some future state.’40  
  
 
(b) The process of secularising 
Charles Taylor describes secularisation between 1500 and 2000 as disenchantment, in which 
the European self changed from being conceived as ‘porous’ to the invasion of spirits and 
demons, to being ‘buffered’ or a protected individual, immune to possession.41 This 
happened against a backdrop of secularisation acting as transition from uniformity to 
diversity of belief, through a ‘nova effect’ of exploding possibilities generated in the 
Enlightenment and its shadow. In this ‘fractured culture of the nova’, Taylor posits that 
unbelief became wholly possible and, gradually, has grown down to the present to be 
common and profound.42 Of this story, Bruce Robbins has written that ‘disenchantment 
seems to me one of the most disabling and sneakily misleading stories we are in the habit of 
telling ourselves regularly’.43 
Taylor spends considerable time exploring the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
developments in society, thought and imagination, evidence from philosophers, theologians 
and his analysis of these, which he sees as facilitating the secularisation process, driving the 
western world through Secularities 1 and 2 – the secularisation of spaces and ideas 
respectively.44 In the process of the nova effect, he notes: ‘a generalized culture of 
“authenticity”, or expressive individualism, in which people are encouraged to find their own 
way, discover their own fulfilment, “do their own thing”’ – a process only reaching its 
                                                          
39 Arnold, Belief, 231. 
40 Thomas, Ends of Life, 266-7. 
41 Taylor, Secular Age, 27.  
42 Taylor, 299.  
43 Robbins, 74.  
44 Robbins, 146-58 at 156 
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apotheosis since the Second World War with Taylor’s ‘buffered self’.45 He sees some 
positives in this world, but also a lot of negatives: ‘a wide sense of malaise at the 
disenchanted world, a sense of it as flat, empty’.46 This is all described as an elite process, 
with no mention of working-class atheism.47 Taylor becomes concerned lest his 
conceptualisation of secularising is overly dependent on ideas, and elevates them rhetorically 
as ‘the great connected chain of mutations in the social imaginary which have helped 
constitute modern society’.48 He sees this as starting off as theory which ‘then gradually 
infiltrates and transmutes social imaginaries’. This sounds, again, awfully like elites having 
tremendously good ideas which trickle down to the attentively-listening common man (and 
woman I suppose), and he seeks to corral this tendency in a short chapter entitled ‘The 
Spectre of Idealism’ – a thing he defines as ‘the attributing to “ideas” of an independent force 
in history’49 – but which spills out to permeate the book’s whole story. If Taylor’s universal 
enchanted pre-1500 world is untenable, so too become the medieval porous self, 
disenchantment, and the later buffered self, enwrapped in its ‘new ethic of rational control’50 
of the self. It’s a story in which modern man (and yes, judging by Taylor’s sources, the story 
seems inviolably male), with his ‘exclusive humanism’, is rhetorically elevated by the end as 
an ‘agent’ in a narrative which, by a plethora of other supplementary stages of rhetorical 
change, diminishes further the preceding religious peasants.  Susan Reynolds comments of 
late medieval France: ‘One Montaillou woman, when asked where she got her doubts about 
hell and the resurrection from, said that she got them from no one: she thought of them for 
herself.’51 This neatly exposes the problem with Taylor-like ideas-driven secularisation 
narratives – they seem to be inescapably elitist, male-centred and ideas-dependent. They are 
also unsatisfyingly static in their conception of society, lacking a sense of the mobility of 
populations – through pilgrimages, economic migrations, simple journeys to markets, new 
lands and settlements, military service, swirling round the seas as well as the lands of Europe, 
and, by 1500, beyond. Taylor depicts the parish as a benign community prison of the 
parochial, the ignorant and universal demon-fearing.  
Lastly, Taylor’s vision of secularisation is a Christian’s one. Taylor allows himself at 
many points to talk of his subject in religious terms which the secular social scientist has 
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difficulty calibrating. His term ‘the sense of fullness’ is the most recurrent, within which he 
precludes the possibility of secularity in atheist terms: ‘We all see our lives, and/or the space 
wherein we live our lives, as having certain moral/spiritual shape.’ The ‘sense of fullness’, he 
says, ‘unsettles and breaks through our ordinary sense of being in the world’.52 Perhaps for 
him and co-religionists it does, but this cannot be an inclusive ‘we’ of all humanity and 
scholarship. There are people – atheists, agnostics and humanists, the religiously disinterested 
and the otherwise preoccupied – who don’t feel this, or don't express what they feel in this 
way. This is observable in Michael Hunter’s recent discovery of a remarkable atheist text 
from an early eighteenth-century Scot.53 And from all this emerges slowly the core problem 
with the Taylorian narrative – its disregard towards, disrespect for, and perhaps denial of the 
atheist. I have been in debate with Christian preachers who deny atheism – its impossibility in 
the person. I ponder whether it is to this position that Taylor also tumbles, without thinking. 
If he does so, he does it in two stages. In the first, he misjudges his Secularity 3 as ‘exclusive 
humanism’ when it isn’t. In the second stage, he fails to consider a further stage, perhaps to 
be tagged as ‘Secularity 4’, of atheists whose disbelief becomes even more ‘real’ than he 
imagines.  
 
 
(c) The problem with Secularity 3 
As well as its other problems, Bruce Robbins observes that ‘A Secular Age also presents 
secularism as a disguised form of Christianity, hiding theological content behind apparently 
secular concepts’.54 Taylor paints secularity as a religious achievement, preserving 
Christianity devoid of demons and the most irrational of medieval beliefs. Likewise, Jon 
Butler opines that each of Taylor’s secularities 1, 2 and 3 are ‘problematic and probably 
wrong’,55  but concludes, rightly in my view, that the most problematic is Secularity 3 upon 
which most attention has fallen, sending – if one American conference I attended is anything 
to go by – scores of young researchers to hunt in modern societies for the buffered self.  
This is where Taylor is more wrong than anywhere in the book. It is here that the 
starkness of the contrast he draws between the enchanted and disenchanted worlds crashes 
down. Historians, sociologists and anthropologists have been researching the enchanted 
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religious believers of the modern western world for more than half a century. Sarah Williams 
and others have shown, often using oral history, the survival of magical belief in folkloric 
religious culture, one rarely or only intermittently spoken of by clergy after 1700 as they 
grew disinterested in unofficial Christian beliefs.56 Enchantment has been all around, but, in a 
millennial symmetry with atheism in the Middle Ages, was rarely heard though all around in 
'secular' twentieth-century society.  
Taylor drives home his polarity – the change from ‘a condition in which belief was 
the default option’ even ‘for those who knew, considered, talked about atheism’. In the 
present, he says, ‘the secular age’ is one in which 'unbelief has become for many the major 
default option’.57 ‘The coming of modern secularity,’ he goes on, ‘has been coterminous with 
the rise of a society in which for the first time in history a purely self-sufficient humanism 
came to be a widely available option’ – a humanism ‘accepting no final goals beyond human 
flourishing’. He adds: ‘Of no previous society was this true.’ Secularity 3 was made possible 
by this exclusive humanism, ending what he calls ‘the era of “naïve” religious faith”’.58 And 
you might think that this sounds like a reasonable portrayal of ‘true secularity’. But the reader 
who flips into passages of this book might miss the religious, resting embedded in his 
Secularity 3. But it is there, especially at the start of the book where he talks of ‘fullness’, its 
spiritual quality, and how even agnostics and atheists must be chasing this. And here, you see 
at once, that religion has really not left Taylor’s ‘immanent frame’. This is a mindset 
thinking, seemingly, of the inevitability of religious things within the individual. Unlike 
Keith Thomas, who starts his study of ‘fulfilment’ in early modern England by noting the 
word did not exist in his period, Taylor is unconcerned with pinning down the genealogy of 
his 'fullness'.59 So, the polarity between medieval simple religious faith and contemporary 
rational secularity is essentially a wee fib. For Taylor is actually all the time envisioning the 
transcendent in modernity. He adds in a footnote as early as page 20 that rock concerts and 
football matches can have in Secularity 3 the same functions in terms of ‘transcendence’ as 
religion.60 So, religion is back in the Taylor frame. It has never left. What is missing, of 
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course, is the notion that, like other humans, those living life as if there is no god have sought 
meaning for life in places other than religion.61 
Secularity 3 is his end point, but Taylor's concept never loses its tether to religion. 
Indeed, he makes plain in the centre of his book that his view of secularisation is that of ‘a 
believer’, and though he acknowledges decline of religion in the modern world, in a rather 
brief passage gives his game away by talking of ‘a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in 
relation to individual and social life’.62 For all his discussion over many pages of ‘In the Age 
of Mobilization’ during 1800-1950 or 1960, and the Second Confessional Age, and ‘the age 
of authenticity’ from 1960 to the present, his ‘hinge moment’63 in the sixties is actually a 
familiar story to those of us who have studied the sexual revolution, New Age religious 
explosion, and the vertiginous downfall of religiosity and church life in most of Europe. He 
offers no vision of a further state of secularity. Is it because he can't? In calibrating constantly 
from religion, Taylor continues to talk in the language of the religious philosopher - of 
immanence and transcendence, fullness, of New Age religions, and the search for the 
authentic self, all in terms strongly shaped by religious ideas. The hint, taken up I think by 
many of his readers in Religious Studies, is of ‘spirituality’, the post-1960s substitute for 
ecclesiastical religion.64 Here is a book that defines, not a secular condition, but merely the 
latest manifestation of the religious one.  
 
  
 
(d) Finding Secularity 4 in the spectrum of atheism 
For, what Taylor fails to engage with is atheism in all its glorious diversity. It is a spectrum of 
attitudes – ranging from diffident perplexity, diverted priorities and silent scepticism, to 
speculative agnosticism, reasoned rationality, new emotional belonging, guttural scoffing, 
raging mockery and ‘theomachy’ – or ‘battling the gods’ in the Greek myths of cosmic war.65 
It is there, to be unearthed in the sources, in every period from the ancients to now, as a 
counterpoint to ecclesiastical authority and discursive religiosity.  
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I want to explore what we might start to learn about atheism from atheist historians 
talking to atheists, unmediated through parish priests, inquisitors, church clerks and Christian 
historians. To begin, let me offer a series of basic principles about atheism across the last two 
millennia and likely more: 
 
Principle I: Being an atheist, like being a Christian, a Muslim, a Jew or a Hindu, means 
belonging within often multi-faith western cultures to a spectrum – of natures of the self, of 
engagement in belief-non-belief issues, and of atheistical beliefs. This spectrum is extensive, 
highly variegated, culturally-influenced, and gendered; as Susan Reynolds wrote in 1991, 
‘Unbelief, like belief, is socially conditioned.’66 So, the atheist and the religionist have been 
hewn from the same stone, but come out as different shapes.  
Principle II: What is generally shared by those on this spectrum is living life as if there is no 
god. This parallels the spectrum of those who self-describe as Christian, from the ardent and 
well-informed believer to the casual self-identifier who neither worships nor learns much 
about the features of the faith. However, atheism is not purely about ‘belief’, but may be 
strongly determined by materiality, life priorities or education.   
Principle III: The atheist spectrum abuts, and in culturally-defined ways overlaps, the 
religious spectrum, encapsulating many positions between interest and indifference (and may 
even include the churchgoer). 
Principle IV: The vast bulk of atheists in all societies tend to lack activities associated with 
their position, and this is not a sign of weakness but intrinsic to the condition. But, if free to 
do so, they may mark rites de passage in secular ways.  
Principle V: Atheists may have distinctive moral and world outlooks, some of which may 
apply across cultures and eras, and some of which may not, but which, nonetheless, afford the 
scholar ways of identifying them in context.   
 
I have expanded elsewhere on the nature of atheism, and of becoming an atheist, and 
reflected on the need to guddle about in social-science research presumptions in order to get 
at the perplexing character of atheism.67 Here, with those basic principles in mind, I use brief 
case studies from my interviews with  84 atheists and humanists raised in eighteen countries - 
interviews which highlight different forms of the atheist self and which, I would argue, may 
be traceable across millennia. 
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My first case study is Ernest Parker born in Washington DC in 1949. His testimony 
reflects the strength of African American religious culture upon his life.68 When eight years 
old, his mother drew him into the Jehovah’s Witnesses, where he quickly joined the 
Theocratic Ministry School, in which role, despite many religious doubts and questions, at 
the age of 15 he became a teacher. He harboured unhappiness with the Church, especially for 
how he was treated following a violent assault, and from his mid-teens drifted for ten years, 
pursued by the Church authorities, leading finally to elders, in a disturbing scene with his 
Mom, telling him he ‘wasn’t in good standing with the congregation’. He was encouraged to 
leave his mother’s house, and, after rejecting bible instruction at the age of 25, he was finally 
‘disfellowshipped’. From there he started studying other religions. ‘It was hard for me to look 
at other religions as having any more, as being any more true.’ He checked them off:  
 
With the Witnesses - it was like a bit like a big trash bin - the Baptists are in there, the 
Catholics are in there. I had some friends who were into Buddhism and other 
religions, and I always had this feeling in the back of my mind that at one time it’s 
possible that there was some truth. And you know, maybe if you go back in time or 
something like that, and studying and looking at these things, that eventually you can 
find it. But I eventually reached a conclusion that either they're all right or they're all 
wrong. And there's no evidence that any of them are right. So they must be all wrong. 
And that was the day that it occurred to me that there was probably no god. 
 
Trying other religions is a common initial step from faith, and through trying Mormonism 
and the New Age, Ernest became gradually more confirmed in a position of no religion. He 
was alienated by ‘these folks, they were going at it full throttle emotional’ to persuade and 
sustain faith in the African American community.  There was no appeal to logic or reason or 
'do you feel the loss of religion in your life?’ Ernest said: ‘They’s just going full out with the 
music and the singin' and the dancin' and you know, “save your soul from hell” and all of that 
stuff.’ For almost thirty years, he stood apart from religion, but without adopting a named 
identity: 
 
Like most African American non-believers we think we're the only one. There are so 
few of us, the influence of the church in our community is so pervasive, that, we think 
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'I'm the only one that feels this way, or thinks this way'. And uhm, quite frankly, until 
recently there's been little or no outreach into the African American community, 
because the assumption has been that all black people are religious.  
 
He speaks with vigour on the context for ethnic minority unbelief – about the slave heritage, 
the segregation, discrimination, the denial of civil rights and justice under the law. And he 
speaks of being ‘dirt poor’, and the division between the black and white poor, and notes with 
fervour the resistance of the black churches in fighting for equality. He acknowledges that an 
African American who leaves religion is conflicted by that, and must remain living within the 
cultural framework.69  
 Ernest’s example says much about Principles I and III – how the atheist spectrum 
closely abuts the religious, the shared cultural heritages, the common belonging. I found 
similar narratives amongst atheists and humanists I have interviewed who were former 
Hindus, Muslims, and from four secular Jews. He says much about Taylor’s Secularity 2, as 
do many people I have interviewed – experiencing the personal loss of faith and religious 
observance. But this applies across time. It is not, as Taylor would have it, an epoch in the 
same way as Secularity 1 can legitimately be tagged. Like Secularity 3, it is a timeless 
condition.    
 My second case study is Mary Wallace who was born in Cheshire in England in 1960, 
and though her parents were socialists with little religious connection, she, like her peers, was 
exposed to a childhood infused with religion – morning assemblies in school, singing in an 
Anglican choir.70 She was active in seeking religious experiences in her teens, reporting ‘a 
little sort of phase at the age of 13, possibly 14, where a best friend at school went to a 
Pentecostal church, an Assembly of God, and I went along with her, I think, for only about 
perhaps about 6 months. But I was completely hooked for 6 months’.  She was swept up by 
the sense of belonging, the drama of the worship (including speaking in tongues), until she 
just worked out that the whole thing 'was absolute gobbledegook’. She drifted without any 
active interest in religion for years until, after marriage and the traumatic loss of a young 
child, she realised in her bereavement that she was an atheist and became a full-time 
Humanist celebrant.  
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There are features in Mary’s testimony which are distinctive to the western European 
atheist and humanist – the brevity of the religious connection, a long period of disinterest in 
religion, often lasting decades, followed from the 1960s to 1990s by the rising principles of 
human rights, gay equality and feminism. In addition, in interview, the religious world is 
recalled and, with a swiftness and firmness, dispatched in such a manner as to deny it 
credence, with no lingering of faith over her life. There’s a cultural sureness that the 
individual has moved on, contrasting with the testimony of non-white ethnic minorities in the 
west where a religious-cum-racial heritage endured in the atheist self. Furthermore, in her 
secular celebrancy, Mary demonstrates well Principles IV and V, including the eternal human 
desire for ritual marking of birth, marriage and death.  
 My last case study is of Christine Raulier who was born in Liege in Belgium in 1923. 
She explained to me that her parents were atheists: ‘the switch, the conversion, if I may say, 
was a generation before me’. The rhetoric from the outset in Christine’s testimony established 
that religion and religiosity were expired, creating a space in her life that had never been 
filled with any substitute or surrogate for religion.  As with everyone I interviewed, the moral 
compass of her humanism was antecedent to her discovery of that rationale; humanism was 
not a faith that conferred goodness, it was the rationalisation of life's lessons, and affirmed 
many of her moral positions on equality, human rights and assisted dying. Christine is one 
example, though not the only form, of Secularity 4, embodying humanity beyond religion, 
transcendence, fullness, or other neo-religious characteristics wrongly attributed to the atheist 
self.  Christine’s narrative of her life was uncomplicated by the intrusion of religion at any 
stage from birth to old age; her mother, she remembers, told her to be ‘certainly not afraid to 
say that I was not religious’. After the war she worked with an international team on the 
impact of radioactive substances on the food chain, and then travelled the world with her 
husband as a Belgian diplomat. Into their eighties, the pair joined the Humanists in large part 
to prepare for their own funerals, meeting the celebrants to leave texts and music choices.  
 Christine’s is a life in which she was perfectly knowledgeable about world religions, 
encountering many during her overseas postings. But she was never in any stress or doubt 
about an atheism into which she grew as a child and teenager, comfortable to proclaim it in 
inter-war Belgium, and to have no participation in religion or its rites de passage. This was a 
twentieth-century woman from a family and educational heritage of atheism, in a society 
which, in Belgium, Netherlands and some other European nations, was modelled from the 
1870s onwards on the basis of ‘religious pillars’, amongst which atheism and socialism was 
one, that conferred the possibility to live one’s life without material, educational, medical, 
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cultural or even occupational encounter with religion. This presaged the wider possibilities 
for atheism in western societies after 1970, and one the historian might learn much from even 
in nations without such formal pillars. Christine exemplifies the atheist with no religion, 
living life without a god, that I met from several European nations where, as one Swede told 
me, to have a religion was regarded by the 1980s and 90s as ‘slightly weird’.71   
 These three examples each evoke Principle II, of living life as if there is no god, and 
display characteristics of the others.  They hint at the ways in which we can formulate 
manners of thinking about atheists in the past. Sure, times were harder for nonbelievers 
before 1800, and the historian needs to factor in the infliction of extreme religious power, the 
self-preserving silence of the atheist, the warping of hostile reportage, the criminalisation of 
faithlessness, and the distress which having no faith might bring when all round was a 
vigorous normativity of belief. But there was, and is, a purity or essence to atheism to which 
the secular self can lead, and we can learn from the modern brethren about the possibilities 
for nonbelievers in the past.      
 
The necessity of atheist scholarship 
Foucault argued that ‘The death of God is not merely an “event” that gave shape to 
contemporary culture as we now know it; it continues tracing indefinitely its great skeletal 
outline.’72 Michael Lackey has written that we need to think not just about atheism but 
‘genuine atheism’ – not godlessness in a negative sense, but in a ‘strict sense’. He writes: 
‘Genuine atheism does not occur in a single moment; it is a process in which the culture 
eliminates from its consciousness the ontotheological assumptions that continue to inform its 
intellectual systems despite the apparent absence of the God concept.’73  
The constant calibration from religion, usually Christianity, and, as in Taylor’s case, 
Catholicism, warps the possibility of envisioning secularity in anything like its potentials. 
Taylor actually half recognises this, admitting that his ‘is a very Christian formulation’, but 
his way getting round this is to invoke Buddhism, as he imagines that religion as a way to an 
appreciation of secularity. He does this because he discounts the ability of reason to make the 
secular. ‘Reason by itself is narrow, blind to the demands of fullness, will run on perhaps to 
destruction, human and ecological’. He continues: ‘[The] Rational mind has to open itself to 
something deeper and fuller.’ He later scoffs at those who argue for ‘the perpetual absence of 
                                                          
71 Anders Östberg interviewed 4 February 2010. 
72 Quoted in M. Lackey, African American Atheists and Political Liberation: A Study of the Sociocultural 
Dynamics of Faith (Gainesville, Fl., University Press of Florida, 2007), 49. 
73 Lackey, 50.  
20 
 
fullness’ in modernity, ascribing this as 'at best a necessary dream'.74 This is editorialising 
about non-religionists’ scholarship, blatant and blunt, ethically questionable, and analytically 
arrested.  
We don’t understand belief and non-belief unless we admit the latter as a legitimate 
possibility and understand it properly. This is, as I said of Christine Raulier, an unfilled space 
where religion has evacuated the self, leaving no lingering ‘fullness’, spirituality or religion-
substituting football matches. Though evidence for the atheism of Secularity 4 might be rare 
before 1900 or 1950, we need to include it in the study of societies of all epochs and cultures. 
We need an open and informed determination to insert atheism, in all its diverse social 
formations, into the narrative of religious history, and nowhere is it more vital than in talking 
about secularisation. We need to get beyond thinking of atheism as solely concerning 
Nietzsche and the 'new atheists' in philosophical and controversialist modes, and to consider 
subjectivities – those of atheists and historians too (just as oral historians are now expected to 
be reflexive). We need the atheist’s appreciation of the social history of atheism, in all its 
flourishing diversity of character and its moral visions, to ensure that the academic study of 
secularisation is not just a project of Christian apologetics as the tide goes out.  
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